Phony Federalism

Phony Federalism
by Thomas J. DiLorenzo

The latest in a string of editorials coming out of the so-called "libertarian" Cato Institute praising Fred Thompson?s presidential campaign is an article in TSCdaily.com on Sept. 13 entitled "FREDeralism! , by Chris Edwards, Cato?s director of tax policy studies. Thompson supports the war in Iraq and almost all of the gross civil liberties abuses championed by his fellow neocons. But he has included in his political rhetoric a few statements about cutting government spending, and that is apparently enough to generate great enthusiasm for him at Cato.

As far as I know, no one at Cato has publicly expressed any enthusiasm at all for the only real libertarian in the presidential race, Congressman Ron Paul. Edwards briefly mentions him in his gushy endorsement of Fred Thompson, but only to deliver a rather backhanded (and totally incorrect) criticism of him. Ron Paul "has been mainly occupied by the war and hasn?t focused his campaign on cutting domestic spending," he writes. Nonsense. During the GOP debates Ron Paul has called for the abolition of the IRS and the Fed, and almost all of the unconstitutional government programs that they finance. On The Daily Show with John Stewart he answered affirmatively to more than a dozen questions by Stewart along the lines of, "Would you eliminate Social Security? Medicare?, etc, etc. Anyone who has paid any attention to the Ron Paul campaign would know this.

The source of Edwards? ecstatic praise for Fred Thompson is a rather lame statement that Thompson made about how "centralized government is not the solution to all our problems . . . this was among the great insights of 1787." Breathtaking, isn?t it? The central government may solve a lot of our problems for us ? perhaps most ? but not all of them. One wonders just how many "problems" centralized government is the solution to, according to Thompson. (Incidentally, Cato is itself highly centralized, so it is reasonable to assume that articles such as the one by Edwards constitute official Institute pronouncements) .

Edwards also praises Thompson for his political rhetoric (not his record as a U.S. Senator) in favor of "federalism." But Edwards doesn?t seem to have much of an understanding of what federalism is (nor does Thompson). He praises the Republican Congress of the 1990s, for example, for "briefly" reviving federalism by allowing some of the states to reform their welfare programs (under the strict direction and supervision of the federal government, of course, which still supplied almost all of the funding for the programs). He also thinks it was a victory for "federalism" that President Reagan reduced the number of programs (but not the total amount of spending) that sent tax dollars from Washington to state governments.

Like all other Cato scholars, Edwards is delighted that Thompson invoked the founding fathers ? well, sort of ? by mentioning the date 1787, the year of the constitutional convention. But Jefferson, Madison, and the other founders would not recognize "federalism" as it is thought of by Cato scholars or Fred Thompson. To the founders federalism meant, first and foremost, that the citizens of the states were sovereign over the central government, which was created to be their agent and to serve their purposes. This meant that they had the right to nullify federal laws which they believed were unconstitutional decisions, and that it would be an abomination and a surrender to tyranny to allow such decisions to be made largely by agents of the central government. St. George Tucker, who authored "the" book on the Jeffersonian interpretation of the Constitution ( A View of the Constitution of the United States) thought that it would be a complete absurdity to have fought a revolution for liberty, and then place everyone?s liberty in the hands of five or six government lawyers with lifetime tenure (i.e., Supreme Court justices).

The Cato Institute, on the other hand, is known for championing the cause of giving even more power to the federal judiciary under the mistaken belief that our black-robed deities can somehow be transformed into libertarians (like Fred Thompson, for instance?! Or perhaps Iraq war/Bush regime apologist Randy Barnett?). Roger Pilon is the best-known Cato scholar who has made this argument, and the Institute has published several books by Clint Bolick that make the same case for giving more power to the central government?s judiciary. This is how to return to federalism?

The founders were also secessionists, having fought a war of secession against the British empire. Massachusetts senator Timothy Pickering, who was George Washington?s adjutant general during the American Revolution and who later served Washington and John Adams as secretary of state and secretary of war, once said that secession was "the" principle of the Revolution.

Thomas Jefferson was the author of America?s first Declaration of Secession (a.k.a., The Declaration of Independence) . The Sage of Monticello, who believed that the Tenth Amendment (and states? rights) was the most important element of the Constitution and its attempt to preserve liberty, continued to support the right of secession for the rest of his life. For example, in a January 29, 1804 letter to Dr. Joseph Priestly Jefferson wrote: "Whether we remain in one confederacy, or form into Atlantic and Mississippi confederacies, I believe not very important to the happiness of either part. Those of the western confederacy will be as much our children and descendants as those of the eastern, and I feel myself as much identified with that country, in future time, as with this . . ." It would never have entered Jefferson?s mind to promise "bloodshed" and "military invasion" if any state seceded, as Abraham Lincoln did in his first inaugural address.

Cato scholars are fond of quoting Jefferson, but this is one quote that one would not expect them to recognize or even acknowledge. On the issue of secession, about which much has been written by myself, Professors Clyde Wilson, Don Livingston, and others ? especially the scholars who co-authored the book Secession, State and Liberty, edited by David Gordon ? the Cato Institute has been silent. But to the founders, federalism, and the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution (which Edwards also praises), had little meaning without the right of secession, which was merely an acknowledgment of citizen sovereignty.

The Jeffersonians understood that the only way the Constitution could be enforced was if the citizens could organize in political communities at the state and local levels and compel their representatives in the nation?s capitol to adhere to it. The central government could never be trusted to enforce limits on its own powers. That?s why they believed that the principles of nullification and secession were indispensable.

Contrary to Edwards? incorrect criticism of him, Ron Paul has in fact made very powerful statements about returning to the principles of federalism ? much more powerful than Fred Thompson?s empty and ill-informed slogans that seem to cause so much excitement at the Cato Institute. The abolition of the Fed and the income tax would eliminate the two features of government that have done as much as anything (next to Lincoln?s war) to centralize power in Washington, D.C. These ? along with the Seventeenth Amendment that requires the direct election of U.S. Senators ? all of which came into being in 1913 ? were the final nails in the "coffin" of states? rights or true federalism, as the founders understood it. As Frank Chodorov wrote in The Income Tax: Root of All Evil:

<dl><dd>[T]he Sixteenth Amendment corroded the American concept of natural right; ultimately reduced the American citizen to a status of subject, so much so that he is not aware of it; enhanced Executive power to the point of reducing Congress to innocuity; and enabled the central government to bribe the states, once independent units, into subservience.

</dd></dl>This is an unquestionably true statement, but not the kind of language that one would use ? or even cite ? if one?s major goal is to be acceptable to the Washington establishment. The same can be said of all of the true principles of federalism or states? rights (i.e., nullification, interposition, secession), as understood by the founders, for the purpose of those principles was to arm the American public with political weapons with which they could slay the federal Leviathan, if necessary. These "weapons" were all but destroyed in 1865, and finished off for good during the "Revolution of 1913."

Reductions in federal grants to state governments is really a ludicrous definition of "federalism." It is a definition that could only be espoused by someone ? like Fred Thompson ? who has no idea of what he is talking about when he uses the term.


http://www.lewrockw ell.com/dilorenz o/dilorenzo129. html
 
Re: Phony Federalism

gross civil liberties abuses

More dramatic bull shit statements without proof from your hero writer. Rest of the article was ignored after I read that statement.

You really need to find a different writer with just a little integrity or is it commonplace now a days to just lie and distort when you write political commentary ?

Fuck this dude Thomas J. DiLorenzo
 
Re: Phony Federalism

More dramatic bull shit statements without proof from your hero writer. Rest of the article was ignored after I read that statement.

You really need to find a different writer with just a little integrity or is it commonplace now a days to just lie and distort when you write political commentary ?

Fuck this dude Thomas J. DiLorenzo

Whom would you recommend Nic?
 
Re: Phony Federalism

Whom would you recommend Nic?


Thomas J. DiLorenzo couldn't carry George Will's luggage. George has had some valid criticisms of the Bush administration ( I have a few of my own for that matter ) so you may want to dig those old articles out since your sole purpose in life is your obvious hatred of Bush.
 
Re: Phony Federalism

Agree on George Will; he has little use for the perpetrators of the current regime and has a strong libertarian streak in him. Here's an example where he points out the horror that FDR birthed:

[SIZE=+2]Declaration of Dependence[/SIZE]
[SIZE=-1]By George F. Will
Sunday, July 8, 2007; B07
[/SIZE]
Some mornings during the autumn of 1933, when the unemployment rate was 22 percent, the president, before getting into his wheelchair, sat in bed, surrounded by economic advisers, setting the price of gold. One morning he said he might raise it 21 cents: "It's a lucky number because it's three times seven." His Treasury secretary wrote that if people knew how gold was priced "they would be frightened."
The Depression's persistence, partly a result of such policy flippancy, was frightening. In 1937, during the depression within the Depression, there occurred the steepest drop in industrial production ever recorded. By January 1938 the unemployment rate was back up to 17.4 percent. The war, not the New Deal, defeated the Depression. Franklin Roosevelt's success was in altering the practice of American politics.
This transformation was actually assisted by the misguided policies -- including government-created uncertainties that paralyzed investors -- that prolonged the Depression. This seemed to validate the notion that the crisis was permanent, so government must be forever hyperactive.
In his second inaugural address, Roosevelt sought "unimagined power" to enforce the "proper subordination" of private power to public power. He got it, and the fact that the federal government he created now seems utterly unexceptional suggests a need for what Amity Shlaes does in a new book. She takes thorough exception to the government he created.
Republicans had long practiced limited interest-group politics on behalf of business with tariffs, gifts of land to railroads and other corporate welfare. Roosevelt, however, made interest-group politics systematic and routine. New Deal policies were calculated to create many constituencies -- labor, retirees, farmers, union members -- to be dependent on government.
Before the 1930s, the adjective "liberal" denoted policies of individualism and individual rights; since Roosevelt, it has primarily pertained to the politics of group interests. So writes Shlaes, a columnist for Bloomberg News, in " The Forgotten Man: A New History of the Great Depression." She says Roosevelt's wager was that, by furiously using legislation and regulations to multiply federally favored groups, and by rhetorically pitting those favored by government against the unfavored, he could create a permanent majority coalition.
In the process, says Shlaes, Roosevelt refined his definition of the "forgotten man." This man had been thought of as a general personality, compatible with the assumption that Americans were all in it together. "Now, by defining his forgotten man as the specific groups he would help, the president was in effect forgetting the rest -- creating a new forgotten man. The country was splitting into those who were Roosevelt's favorites and everyone else."
Acting with what Shlaes calls "the restlessness of the invalid," Roosevelt implemented the theory that (in her words) "spending promoted growth, if government was big enough to spend enough." In only 12 months, just one Roosevelt improvisation, the National Recovery Administration, "generated more paper than the entire legislative output of the federal government since 1789."
Before Roosevelt, the federal government was unimpressive relative to the private sector. Under Calvin Coolidge, the last pre-Depression president, its revenue averaged 4 percent of gross domestic product, compared with 18.6 percent today. In 1910, Congress legislated height limits for Washington buildings, limits that prevented skyscrapers, symbols of mighty business, from overshadowing the Capitol, the symbol of government.
In 1936, for the first time in peacetime history, federal spending exceeded that of the states and localities combined. Roosevelt said that modern "civilization" has tended "to make life insecure." Hence Social Security, which had the added purpose of encouraging workers to retire, thereby opening jobs to younger people. Notice the assumptions of permanent scarcity, and that the government has a duty to distribute scarce things, such as work.
In 1938, when the New Deal's failure to spark recovery made Roosevelt increasingly frantic, he attempted to enlarge the Supreme Court so he could pack it with compliant justices. He said Americans had the right to "insist that every agency of popular government" respond to "their will." He included the court among "popular," meaning political and representative, institutions.
Roosevelt's overreaching called forth an opponent whom Shlaes rescues from obscurity. Wendell Willkie, who would be Roosevelt's opponent in a 1940 election overshadowed by war, called on Roosevelt to "give up this vested interest you have in depression" as the justification for a "philosophy of distributed scarcity."
War, as has been said -- and as George W. Bush's assertion of vast presidential powers attests -- is the health of the state. But as Roosevelt demonstrated and Shlaes reminds us, compassion, understood as making the "insecure" securely dependent, also makes the state flourish.
georgewill@washpost.com


George F. Will - Declaration of Dependence - washingtonpost.com
 
Re: Phony Federalism

Thomas J. DiLorenzo couldn't carry George Will's luggage. George has had some valid criticisms of the Bush administration ( I have a few of my own for that matter ) so you may want to dig those old articles out since your sole purpose in life is your obvious hatred of Bush.


Bush, whom I voted for twice, has earned my dislike and distrust.

I read a lot of George Will. In fact, here is an excellent piece by him in the WASHINGTON POST:

A War Still Seeking a Mission

By George F. Will
Tuesday, September 11, 2007; Page A17




Before Gen. David Petraeus's report, and to give it a context of optimism, the president visited Iraq's Anbar province to underscore the success of the surge in making some hitherto anarchic areas less so. More significant, however, was that the president did not visit Baghdad. This underscored the fact that the surge has failed, as measured by the president's and Petraeus's standards of success.


Those who today stridently insist that the surge has succeeded also say they are especially supportive of the president, Petraeus and the military generally. But at the beginning of the surge, both Petraeus and the president defined success in a way that took the achievement of success out of America's hands.



The purpose of the surge, they said, is to buy time -- "breathing space," the president says -- for Iraqi political reconciliation. Because progress toward that has been negligible, there is no satisfactory answer to this question: What is the U.S. military mission in Iraq?


Many of those who insist that the surge is a harbinger of U.S. victory in Iraq are making the same mistake they made in 1991 when they urged an advance on Baghdad, and in 2003 when they underestimated the challenge of building democracy there. The mistake is exaggerating the relevance of U.S. military power to achieve political progress in a society riven by ethnic and sectarian hatreds. America's military leaders, who are professional realists, do not make this mistake.


The progress that Petraeus reports in improving security in portions of Iraq is real. It might, however, have two sinister aspects.


First, measuring sectarian violence is problematic: The Post reports that a body with a bullet hole in the front of the skull is considered a victim of criminality; a hole in the back of the skull is evidence of sectarian violence. But even if violence is declining, that might be partly because violent sectarian cleansing has separated Sunni and Shiite communities. This homogenization of hostile factions -- trained and armed by U.S. forces -- may bear poisonous fruit in a full-blown civil war.


Second, brutalities by al-Qaeda in Iraq have indeed provoked some Sunni leaders to collaborate with U.S. forces. But these alliances of convenience might be inconvenient when Shiites again become the Sunnis' principal enemy.


Congressional Democrats should accept Petraeus's report as a reason to declare a victory, one that might make this fact somewhat palatable: Substantial numbers of U.S. forces will be in Iraq when the next president is inaugurated.

The Democrats' "victory" -- a chimera but a useful one -- is that Petraeus indicates there soon can be a small reduction of U.S. forces.

To declare this a substantial victory won by them requires Democrats to do two things. They must make a mountain out of a molehill (Petraeus suggests withdrawal of only a few thousand troops). And they must spuriously claim credit for the mountain. Actually, senior military officers have been saying that a large drawdown is inevitable, given the toll taken on the forces by the tempo of operations for more than four years.

But Democrats cannot advertise a small withdrawal as a victory without further infuriating their party's base, the source of energy and money. The base is incandescent because there are more troops in Iraq today than there were on Election Day 2006, when Democratic activists and donors thought, not without reason, that congressional Democrats acquired the power to end U.S. involvement in Iraq.


A democracy, wrote the diplomat and scholar George Kennan, "fights for the very reason that it was forced to go to war. It fights to punish the power that was rash enough and hostile enough to provoke it -- to teach that power a lesson it will not forget, to prevent the thing from happening again. Such a war must be carried to the bitter end." Which is why "unconditional surrender" was a natural U.S. goal in World War II and why Americans were so uncomfortable with three "wars of choice" since then -- in Korea, Vietnam and Iraq.


What "forced" America to go to war in 2003 -- the "gathering danger" of weapons of mass destruction -- was fictitious. That is one reason this war will not be fought, at least not by Americans, to the bitter end. The end of the war will, however, be bitter for Americans, partly because the president's decision to visit Iraq without visiting its capital confirmed the flimsiness of the fallback rationale for the war -- the creation of a unified, pluralist Iraq.


After more than four years of war, two questions persist: Is there an Iraq? Are there Iraqis?


georgewill@washpost.com


http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/09/10/AR2007091002065.html?sub=new
 
Re: Phony Federalism

Doc Diggin started a thread about the War Seeking a Mission column; I saw it but wanted to show his small central government libertarian bent. When he writes on such topic he is devastating in his argument construction and reasoning.
 
Re: Phony Federalism

Doc Diggin started a thread about the War Seeking a Mission column; I saw it but wanted to show his small central government libertarian bent. When he writes on such topic he is devastating in his argument construction and reasoning.


There is no doubt George Will is a mental giant.
 
Re: Phony Federalism

I've always been honest with myself, Nic. It's one of the reasons I will never vote for a Republican again.

You were not admitting to that earlier -- I am glad to see that you are becoming true to your convictions. What is next -- you going to go AWOL from the military ?
 
Re: Phony Federalism

You were not admitting to that earlier -- I am glad to see that you are becoming true to your convictions. What is next -- you going to go AWOL from the military ?


Not a chance, Nic. Since I actually believe in my oath to support and defend the Constitution, I plan on hanging around. I'll also be hanging around here to remind you that you are nothing more than a CHEERLEADER for the GOP. Unable to do anything more.
 
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